Wrongful Death Complaint Against Yacht Club Alleges Facts Sufficient to Support Claim

Tew v. Fairhope Yacht Club, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86840, 2018 WL 3194886

By: Jacob Williams

This action arises out of the death of Adam Clark whose vessel capsized in the Mobile Bay during a storm while participating in the Dauphin Island Boat Race on April 25, 2015. Plaintiff Angelina A. Tew, on behalf of herself and as Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of Adam Dean Clark filed a wrongful death complaint against Defendant Fairhope Yacht Club (“FYC”) in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Alabama. FYC filed the instant motion to dismiss all claims with prejudice. The sole issue before the court was whether the Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrated that Defendant either possessed or assumed a duty to the participants in the race it conducted.Race Officials were given warnings of possible severe thunderstorms the evening before the race, the morning of the race, and the evening of the race. Initially, the FYC cancelled the race, but removed the cancellation notice approximately twenty-six minutes later. Race officials occupied a forty-eight-foot motor yacht at the finish line. Although they were made aware of the possible severe thunderstorm, they did not communicate the warnings to the race participants and did not participate in a search effort until two hours after the storm passed.Count One of the Plaintiff’s complaint asserted a negligence cause of action alleging that the decision to reverse the initial cancellation due to inclement weather was negligent and caused the decedent’s vessel to be positioned directly in the path of the storm.Count Two asserted a cause of action for failure to provide assistance at sea as required by 46 U.S.C. § 2304. Tew alleged that the two FYC race officials aboard the forty-eight-foot yacht were aware or should have been aware of the general location of Clark’s vessel and deliberately failed to render assistance. Further bolstering this claim was the allegation that race officials were capable of safely rendering assistance to the stranded race participants but chose to do nothing until two hours after the storm has passed.Count Three alleged that the Defendant wantonly disregarded its duty to warn the race participants of the severe weather both through alerts issued by the various news and weather outlets generally, and by direct warning to Defendant from the U.S. Coast Guard.In evaluating FYC’s motion to dismiss, the court did not substantively deviate from the analysis in Brown v. Fairhope Yacht Club, CA No. 18-0061-CG-MU, Doc. 24. As in Brown, FYC claimed it owed no duty to the participants of the 2015 Dauphin Island Race under general maritime law, and therefore, cannot be held liable.The parties contended that this case presented an issue of first impression. However, neither cited cases that delineates the duty of a yacht club which: (1) controls the timing, regulation and acceptance of entrants into the race; (2) charts the course of the race; and (3) enters into a contract whereby it accepts the responsibility of “instruction to and qualification of participants, safety equipment inspections.” The court relying on treatises concluded that “much of general maritime tort law is borrowed state law.” The judge stated that the elements for maritime negligence are “the existence of a duty required by law which obliges the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks,” breach of that duty, proximate cause, and damage suffered by the plaintiff. Schoenbaum, Supra, at § 5-2.The court declined to state the extent of the defendant’s duty owed to the race participants. At this stage, it asked only if the plaintiff has adequately stated claims for which relief can be granted. Ultimately, the judge found that the Plaintiff’s Complaint met the liberal pleading standard required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as clarified by Twombly and Iqbal and that the Plaintiff adequately alleged sufficient facts which, if taken as true, would support a claim on its face. Accordingly, the court denied FYC’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.