To Be a Seaman or Not to Be; The Remedies Awarded
Larrison v. Ocean Beauty Seafoods, LLC, No. C20-906-RSM, 2023 WL 197271, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2023).
Author: Jakob R. Jackson
The plaintiff, Richard Larrison, was injured while trying to manually move heavy equipment aboard the F/V RETRIEVER in December of 2016.1 Larrison asserted causes of action under the Jones Act and the Longshore Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (LHWCA) in the United State District Court for the District of Oregon.2 The Jones Act claim was for negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, as well as breach of duty under LHWCA.3 This action was brought against the defendants, Ocean Beauty Seafoods, LLC (“Ocean Beauty”) and Retriever Tender Alaska, LLC (“RTA”). The defendants motioned for Summary Judgment.4
On the day of the alleged incident, the F/V RETRIEVER underwent repairs overseen by Mattsen Management (Mattsen)5 which regularly hired employees, including Larrison, on an hourly basis to conduct repairs and maintain vessels before returning to sea.6 Ocean Beauty maintained they were not involved with the operations of Mattsen.7
The alleged incident occurred when a Mattsen employee instructed Larrison, on two separate occasions, to manually move cod tendering equipment alone.8 The manual instruction was due to the hydraulic crane aboard the vessel being out of commission.9 Larrison stated that he started experiencing pain in his neck, leg, and back following the movement of the equipment.10
Ocean Beauty argued that Larrison is unable to assert claims under the Jones Act because he was not a seaman.11 The Jones Act only applies to seamen injured during the course of their employment, but it does not cover individuals who are probable or expectant seamen.12 Unseaworthiness is also only a remedy awarded to seamen and a ship’s crewmembers.13 Similarly, “maintenance, cure, and unearned wages are . . . available only to seamen.”14
In determining seamen status, courts look to the circumstances of the individual at the time of his injury.15 Defendants argued Larrison was a laborer repairing vessels and not employed as a crew member.16 Therefore, defendants argued Larrison was at most a probable or expectant seamen at the time of his injury.17 Larrison stated he entered into a “handshake deal” with the captain regarding his future employment aboard the F/V RETRIEVER.18 Ocean Beauty asserted this admission of future employment gives weight to the argument that Larrison was merely an expectant seaman not covered by the Jones Act.19
Ocean Beauty further argued that, at the time of injury, Larrison was not contributing to the mission of the vessel (tendering) but simply conducted repairs.20 Larrison stated his injury occurred while the vessel was engaged in sea trials where he functioned as a crewmember.21 Larrison did not cite authority distinguishing his role from that of a longshoreman. Defendants cited Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis in which the Supreme Court recognized “that the mere fact a land-based worker is aboard the vessel when it leaves shore does not convert that worker into a Jones Act seaman.”22 The court stated, “the total circumstances of an individual’s employment must be weighed to determine . . . a sufficient relation to the navigation of the vessel.”23 The district court held the totality of Larrison’s employment only supports one reasonable conclusion: Larrison was not a seaman and cannot bring claims under the Jones Act.24
As for the LHWCA claim, Larrison argued the defendants violated their turnover duty.25 Third party vessel owners owe a duty to turn over the vessel and its equipment in such a capacity that an experienced operator can carry on operations when exercising reasonable care.26 Larrison argued that the failure of the hydraulic crane required an unreasonable amount of effort to move the equipment which caused the injury.27 Larrison stated the crane could be operated but was dangerous to do so.28
Ocean Beauty contended, though the crane was potentially inoperable to a lay person, they are only required to turn over the vessel in a condition that an experienced longshore worker could reasonably work.29 They cited Haines v. Honolulu Shipyard, Inc. stating “certain dangers that may be hazardous to unskilled persons need not be remedied if an expert and experienced worker could safely work around them.”30 A plaintiff must prove that the hazard was of such a degree that even an experienced expert would be unable to carry on operations.31
Defendants maintained there was no evidence indicating the movement of the equipment could not be done safely.32 Defendants further argued the unsafe decision to decommission the crane and to manually move the equipment was made by Mattsen.33
Therefore, the court held there was no evidence to suggest the Ocean Beauty breached its turnover duty and the unsafe situation was created by Mattsen.34 The court did not find a genuine factual issue and find in favor of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.35
1 Larrison v. Ocean Beauty Seafoods, LLC, No. C20-906-RSM, 2023 WL 197271 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2023).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at *2.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at *3.
12 Id. (citing Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 190-91 (1952)).
13 Id. (citing Smith v. Harbor Towing & Fleeting, Inc., 910 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1990)).
14 Id. (citing Whitman v. Miles, 387 F.3d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2004)).
15 Id. (citing Petersen v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 784 F.2d 732 739 (6th Cir. 1986)).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at *4.
22 Id.
23 Id. (citing Wallace v. Oceaneering Int’l, 727 F.2d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1984)).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at *5 (citing Riggs v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 8 F.3d 1442, 1444 (9th Cir. 1993)).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. (citing Haines v. Honolulu Shipyard, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Haw. 2000)).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
