Apprentice Diver Denied Seaman Status

Stringer v. Specialty Offshore, Inc., et al., Slip Copy 2025 WL 3187067 (E.D. La. November 14, 2025).

By Fraser K. Mitchell, Associate Attorney at Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith

      The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted Specialty Offshore, Inc.’s (“Specialty”) motion for summary judgment, determining that Specialty’s employee, Nicholas Stringer (“Stringer”), was not a Jones Act seaman.[1]

      Stringer began working for Specialty in June of 2023 as a dive tender.[2] His various job responsibilities included working as an apprentice diver, general construction worker, and, on one occasion, in December 2024, he acted as a lookout on a barge that was being pushed to his worksite, where the vessel would serve as a dive support vessel.[3] Stringer was working on the barge, which Specialty rented from Compass Marine to be used as a platform to hold dive support equipment at the dive site on the Ohio River.[4] On December 19, 2024, after he had conducted a series of dives, Stringer claimed to have experienced central nervous system decompression illness (“bends”) because of Specialty’s failure to (1) provide proper diving equipment and (2) provide him with prompt medical treatment.[5] Stringer then filed suit against his employer for negligence under both the Jones Act and general maritime law, while making additional claims of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure.[6]

       Initially, Stringer moved for partial summary judgment to dispose of the seaman-status dispute asserting that (1) he was part of an established “commercial diver exception” and was thus automatically considered a Jones Act seaman without needing to satisfy the traditional test for seaman-status; or, in the alternative; (2) the details of his employment were sufficient to satisfy the seaman-status test under Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, as well as the refined Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, L.L.C. factors.[7] Judge Ashe initially ruled that more discovery was required on the issue of whether Stringer satisfied the traditional seaman-status test, but also held that there is no blanket “commercial diver exception” to the seaman-status test, and even if a limited exception exists, such an exception would not apply to Stringer because he did not live and work on vessels in the open sea.[8]

        The district court found that the factual scenario of Stringer’s employment with Specialty was analogous to Meaux v. Cooper Consolidated, LLC[9] and Rutherford[10] v. Pontchartrain Materials Corp.[11] Judge Ashe ultimately determined that Stringer failed to satisfy the Sanchez factors of the seaman-status test.[12] Stringer’s work as a diver could arguably be described as seagoing activity, but Stringer owed his allegiance to Specialty, his shoreside employer, rather than to the barge he was working on at the time of his injury.[13] To this point, Stringer was assigned to multiple vessels, and many of these were not owned by Specialty.[14]

         Although Stringer was injured on the same vessel on which he had traveled and acted as a lookout for the vessel that took him to the dive site, the district court determined that this one-time occurrence was insufficient to satisfy the Sanchez factor, which requires a seaman to sail with the vessel from port to port.[15] Stringer, according to the district court, performed a limited, discrete task while riding the barge and used the barge as a dive support vessel; and there was also no evidence that he would ever work on this barge again after this particular job ended. Finally, Judge Ashe held that Stringer was not taken to sea by his employment, almost all of his assignments with Specialty were performed a gangplank from shore, and with respect to the job that Stringer was injured on, he lived on land, drove to work, and boarded the dive support vessel by ladder.[16]

Accordingly, the district court granted Specialty’s motion for summary judgment on the issue that Stringer was not a Jones Act seaman, and Stringer’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

[1] Stringer v. Specialty Offshore, Inc., et al., Slip Copy 2025 WL 3187067 at *1 (E.D. La. November 14, 2025).

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at *2.

[6] Stringer, 2025 WL 3187067 at *2.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at *3.

[9] 601 F. Supp. 3d 38 (E.D. La. 2022).

[10] 732 F. Supp. 3d 536 (E.D. La. 2024).

[11] Stringer, 2025 WL 3187067 at *9.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Stringer, 2025 WL 3187067 at *9.